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1. Introduction  
In recent years, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is rapid progress and has 
been widely used in daily life. RFID systems consist of three components: radio frequency 
(RF) tags, RF readers and a back-end database server. A passive RFID tag is a microchip 
capable of transmitting a static identifier or serial number for a short distance. Readers 
query tags for their contents by broadcasting an RF signal. Tags respond with resident data, 
such as a unique serial number. Tag data may be read automatically without line of sight. 
RFID systems have many applications in supply chain managements, inventory control, 
anti-counterfeiting, ticketing systems, healthcare and smart home developments.  
However, it may bring up some privacy threats. Anyone can easily access tagged items and 
collect data without line of sight that personal privacy under threat. The most concerned 
issues are the tracking and the location privacy. Based on the characteristic of outstanding 
traceability, the history of the tag’s location might be identified as a tag’s information is 
intercepted and collected by the attacker in different location. For instance, the unique tag’s 
EPC data can be used to trace a person or an object carrying a tag in time and space. The 
collected information can be merged and linked in order to generate a person’s profile. It 
will be a serious problem as RFID tags are widely used. 
Without privacy protection, a person with carried RFID tags can be tracked and profiled by 
unauthorized people. The unique information of the items may be indicated that a customer 
carrying those tags is subject to track from unauthorized readers. 
Ideal RFID systems used in product lifecycle should satisfy high confidentiality, anonymity, 
integrity and high availability (Gao et al., 2004; Pisarsky, 2004). The product life cycle is a 
procedure that the product from manufacture to be recycled. This procedure from the 
perspective of commerce can be divided into five stages(Figure 1): (1)&(2) are the stage of 
“production to retail store” (business-to-business) , (3) is the stage of “retail store to 
customer” (business-to-customer), (4) is the stage of “individual sales” (customer-to-
customer), (5)&(6) are the stage of “after-sales service”, and (7) is the stage of “recycling” 
(reverse logistics). Since a tag is embedded in the product, security risks such as privacy 
threats may be occurred in each stage of the product life cycle. 
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Fig. 1. The product life cycle. 
To our desirable point, researchers need to pay more effort to develop object identication 
throughout the life cycle with guaranteeing the corporate and personal privacy, illegal 
tracking, unauthorized profiling, impersonating, cloning, and illegal reading/writing. This 
article is not purpose of an exhaustive literature survey but summarizes some aspects of 
RFID authentication and access control in the proposed studies. 
2. Basic RFID tags 
In most RFID systems, tags automatically emit their unique serial numbers upon reader 
interrogation without alerting their users. The challenge in providing security for RFID tags 
is such kinds of low-cost device unable to perform basic cryptographic operations. Basic 
RFID tags just have a little rewritable memory, even have no programmable-supported 
computing capability. At best, such RFID tags may include security functions supporting 
keyed reads and keyed writes which essentially just like PIN-controlled data accesses. In 
this section, we show how privacy and authentication may be considerably improved in 
low-cost RFID tags with only a small enhancement of their capabilities. 
2.1 Killing and sleeping 
The “kill command” method is a straightforward approach to make a tag no longer 
functional. This approach proposed by the AutoID Center is indeed for tags to be killed 
upon purchase of the tagged product. A tag can be killed by sending it a special “kill 
command” with a short PIN (Sarma et al., 2002; Weis et al., 2003). As the tag receives the 
“kill” command, its state changes into the inoperative state. Kill the tag technique is to 
restrict the use of a tag by removing its identity. As shown in Fig. 2, the killed tag has no 
way to change back to the inventoried state. It cannot be identified for more detailed 
information again. For example, purchased goods would be killed at checkout clerks such 
that no one would contain active RFID tags for protecting the consumer privacy. This 
solution is simple and effective but the tag can not be reused. Clearly, the tag’s lifecycle is 
end and it cannot be applied for after-sale purposes. 
 Production Warehouse Retail Store      
Recycling 2nd Customer 1st Customer 
(1) (2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) (6) 
(7) 
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Fig. 2. The state changing of the tag in killing approach 
Another kind of solution is using the “sleeping” mechanism. As the reader sends a “sleep” 
command to the tag, the tag will temporarily inactive. The sleeping tag can be waked as the 
tag receives PIN from the reader. The state changing of the tag is shown in Fig. 3. The tag’s 
state can be switched between inventoried and sleep. For controlling the tag’s access, the 
tag’s owner has to manage the PINs of all tags on purchased good. Unfortunately, 
passwords may be overheard or collected by spoofing a tag. This approach also pose other 
problems: a set of tags use a single generic PIN which can be easily defeated, but each tag 
use a unique PIN which could be uniquely identified by the adversary. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The state changing of the tag in sleeping approach 
2.2 Renaming approach 
The solutions of relabeling or re-encrypting the tag’s serial number were proposed for 
minimal security requirements. This approach takes into account the natural computational 
limitations of RFID tags, it involves no computational operations but only relatively little 
storage. The relabelled or re-encrypted serial number is overwritten to the tag at checkout 
for protecting the consumer’s privacy. This is possible for current generation tags and 
would prevent the unauthorized compilation of bibliographic directories. However, even if 
the relabelled or re-encrypted identifier emitted by an RFID tag has no intrinsic meaning, it 
can still be tracked since the relabelled or re-encrypted identifier is just a static meta-
identifier. Therefore, point-to-point tracking is possible if the meta-identifier is not changed 
over time. For this reason, this approach does not solve the problem of privacy.  
2.2.1 Relabeling 
Sarma et al. (2003) proposed an idea to protect the tracking problem (Sarma et al., 2003). As 
a customer purchases goods, the reader sends a “delete” command at the point of sale such 
that the tags’ unique serial number is erased. Only the product code information of the tag is 
retained for later use. The state changing of the tag is shown in Fig. 4. However, the tracing 
problem is still existed to distinguish individual by a fixed group RFID-tagged products. For 
example, someone is a fan of a particular brand will always take the brand’s shoes, watch 
Inventoried
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temporary  
inactive 
reader sends “sleep” command
reader sends PIN
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Killed 
inoperative reader sends “kill” command
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and bag such that tracking is still possible by associating these kinds of particular tag types 
with holder identities. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Sarma’s idea for erasing the tag’s unique identifier 
Inoue & Yasuura (2003) proposed another relabling approach to offer users the identifier’s 
controllability for protecting privacy (Inoue & Yasuura, 2003; Inoue et al., 2002). Each tag 
has a read-only memory (ROM) and an electrically-erasable programmable read-only 
memory (EEPROM). These two memories are used exclusively. The state changing of the tag 
is shown in Fig. 5. A unique and permanent identity is stored in the tag’s ROM by the 
producer. As the tag remains on ROM mode, the permanent identity can be read. The tag 
can provide unlimited identification with ROM mode for total management at its 
production, distribution, and sale stage. For purchased goods, the owner can set a private 
and temporary identity in EEPROM. As switching to EEPROM mode, the tag cannot operate 
the permanent object identification. Even the temporary identity can be read by anyone, no 
one can recognize the tag since the information about the object in the network is distributed 
accompanying the permanent identity on the ROM as a key. Therefore, the adversary has 
nothing to do with the temporary identity. The object can be identified only by the owner. 
Moreover, the tag can be switched to ROM mode again by certificating the owner or 
restricting the change only via contacted communication. This approach remains the 
permanent identity for life cycle of the object. As the object is discarded, the scrap merchant 
can make the tag to be switched to ROM mode to operate the permanent object 
identification and utilize it for recycling. However, the temporary identity is unique and 
cannot avoid the point-to-point tracing problem since it could be uniquely identified by the 
adversary. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Inoue’s double mode tag 
Kinosita et al. (2003) proposed another approach to rewrite the tag (Kinosita et al., 2003). As 
a customer purchases the product on checkout, the reader rewrites a new random number 
to the tag. Fig. 6 shows the state changing of the tag. However, the random identifier is 
unique and cannot avoid the point-to-point tracing problem since it could be uniquely 
identified by the adversary. 
Inventoried
ROM mode
Inventoried 
EEPROM mode the tag is switched to the “EEPROM mode”
the tag is switched to the “ROM mode”
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without unique 
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Fig. 6. Kinosita’s approach to rewrite the tag 
2.2.2 Re-encryption 
Juels & Pappu’s (2003) proposed an approach based on re-encryption concept (Juels & 
Pappu, 2003). The public key cryptosystem is used in this scheme. The data of a banknote is 
arranged into optical and radio frequency areas. A unique serial number and a signature are 
printed on the banknote. The banknote serial number and signature are encrypted by the 
law-enforcement’s public key. The resulting ciphertexts are stored in the banknote’s tag. 
Clearly, the tag can be authenticated as the ciphertexts are decrypted by the law-
enforcement for verifying the signature of serial number. For rendering multiple 
appearances of the tag unlinkable, these ciphertexts are re-encrypted with a new encryption 
factor by the law-enforcement’s public key after each access session. The encryption-
operation requires high computational loading which is performed by the reader not the 
tag. The change in each appearance is designed for preventing the tracing problem. Fig. 7 
shows the state changing of the tag. However, the ciphertexts keep constant (Ohkubo et. al, 
2003) such that the tag still can be traced between twice re-encryptions. It means the tag 
must be rewritten often. This makes re-encryption approach unsuitable in practical. Basing 
on the re-encryption concept, a similar scheme proposed by Golle et al. (Golle P et al., 2004) 
known as universal re-encryption mechanism. It is essentially a special extension of the 
ElGamal cryptosystem (Elgamal T., 1985) in which re-encryption is possible without 
knowledge of public keys. However, this universal re-encryption mechanism has a practical 
drawback of requiring the role of agent to perform re-encryption. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Juels & Pappu’s re-encryption approach 
2.3 Distance measurement 
Fishkin et al. proposed an approach to measure the distance between the reader and the tag 
(Fishkin et al., 2004). An adversary usually interrogates the tag in the far distance. Fishkin et 
al. observes and analyzes the energy of the received signal by the tag. The distance between 
the reader and the tag can be estimated by the signal-to-noise ratio. This distance 
information is used as a variable in a tiered authentication scheme, where the tag releases 
general or specific information to the reader according to the distance variable. Fig. 8 shows 
the state changing of the tag. 
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Fig. 8. Fishkin’s approach 
2.4 Blocking & soft blocking 
Juels et al’s (2003) proposed a mechanism to interfere with the readers' interrogation by a 
blocker tag (Juels et al., 2003). The blocker tag simulates all possible RFID tags to prevent the 
malicious identification of the target tag. This privacy protection scheme depends on adding 
a privacy bit to the tag. While inside a store, the tag’s privacy bit usually is set to 0, 
indicating public access to the tag’s identification. While during checkout, this privacy bit is 
changed to 1, denoting the tag is entering restricted access. Then the tag must interact with 
another tag known as the “blocker tag” (Juels et al., 2003). The blocker tag broadcasts radio 
signals to block/disrupt nearby RFID readers could work. It is accomplished through non-
standard interaction with the anti-collision protocols employed in tag-reading session 
(Auto-ID Center, 2003; Sarma, 2001). The blocker tag will manipulate the query result of a 
normal tag by scrambling the bits of certain tags determined by their privacy bit (Juels & 
Brainard, 2004). The state changing of the tag is shown in Fig. 9. As the privacy bit is set to 0, 
the tag can be unrestricted scanned and the blocker tag doesn’t interrupt the reading of tag. 
As the privacy bit is set to 1, the tag is private with restricted access under the cover of 
blocker tag. Juels and Brainard proposed an enhancement mechanism called soft blocking 
(Juels & Brainard, 2004). The soft blocker tag transmits a policy statement to enforces and 
monitors the reader not violate the security policies. However, blocker tag is expensive 
(Cavoukian, 2004) and suffers from the heterogeneity of current RFID systems using 
different frequencies, air protocols, etc. The blocker tag and its variants have limited 
applicability. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Blocking approach 
3. Symmetric-key tags 
Symmetric-key tags are considered as the type of security obtainable with a small amount of 
rewritable memory, but very limited computing capability. Such RFID tags may be expected 
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to perform some basic computational operations, but not conventional cryptographic ones. 
Many approaches have been proposed to achieve private authentication in such RFID 
systems. The proposals usually include hash function, silent tree-walking, or other light 
cryptography-based approaches to prevent the unauthorized reading of RFID tags. Most 
researchers devoted to show that standard cryptographic functionality is not needed to 
achieve stronger security in RFID tags. Since the communication between the reader and the 
tag is using RF signals, which make an RFID system vulnerable to various attacks such as 
eavesdropping, traffic analysis, spoofing and denial of service. Within the scanning range, a 
malicious reader can perform bogus authentication with detected tags to retrieve sensitive 
information. The sensitive information may be disclosed and hence infringe on the user’s 
privacy. Traceability is another type of privacy violation, the relation between the user and 
the tag can be found will cause the tracing of the tag makes the tracing of the user possible 
(Avoine & Oechslin, 2005). The proliferation of RFID applications (Ni et al., 2003) raises an 
emerging requirement – protecting user privacy (Robinson & Beigl, 2003) in RFID 
authentications. 
As the relationship is illustrated (Fig. 10) in Weis’s paper (Weis et al, 2003), the forward 
channel (reader-to-tag) is assumed to be easily monitored by an adversary since the signal 
broadcasted by the reader is strong enough, the backward channel (tag-to-reader) is 
relatively much weaker and may only be monitor by an adversary within the tag’s shorter 
operating range. The reader-to-tag (forward) channel and the tag-to-reader (backward) 
channel are assumed not secure, but eavesdroppers may only monitor the forward channel 
without detection. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Forward vs. backward channels 
In this section, we show how privacy and authentication may be considerably developed. It 
needs to take into account the natural computational limitations and the likely attack 
scenarios. The challenge in providing security for low-cost RFID tags is that they are 
computationally weak devices, unable to perform even basic symmetric-key cryptographic 
operations. 
Backward Range (Eavesdroppers within the range can be seen) 
Forward Range (Eavesdroppers can monitor the signal without detection)
Tag Reader 
Eavesdropper 
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3.1 Non-indexed key-search approach 
The general approach of key search for RFID-tag identification was proposed by Weis et al. 
(2003). Upon receiving a query from the reader, the tag first sends the hash value of its key 
with a random nonce. Without any index, the reader must compute for all keys until it 
identify the tag. As the tag responds with different values every time, the reader must 
exhaustively search until it finds the matched one. The scheme is not scalable for a huge 
number of tags since many computations must be performed at the back-end.(Rhee et al., 
2005; Weis et al., 2003) 
Weis et al. (2003) proposed two simple hash-based access control protocols, the hash-lock 
scheme and the randomized hash-lock scheme (Weis et al., 2003). Fig. 11 shows the 
randomized hash-lock scheme. Each tag has its initial iID  is issued by the back-end 
database server. As the reader tries to access the tag, the tag’s response is a hash value 
( || )
i
h ID R   generated by hashing the tag’s iID  concatenated with a random number R . 
If the reader is legal, it can ask the back-end database server to provide all tags’ identities. 
Then the reader performs a brute-force searching comparison between  and ( || )kh ID R  to 
find the corresponding record. This scheme is not scalable since the reader’s computational 
loading is O(n). 
 
 
Fig. 11. Weis‘s randomized access control scheme 
The motivation of this scheme is to make the tag’s response message not predictable to 
prevent the tracing of individual. To randomizes tag responses instead of a invariable tag 
response in order to protect location privacy. However, the tag still can be traced as shown 
in the following use-case diagram (Fig. 12). An adversary can eavesdrop on the legal 
reader’s broadcasts 
i
ID  for collecting to its own database. As the target tag’s identity is 
collected, the adversary immediately realizes the tag had appeared on the location. In 
addition, the adversary may interrogate a tag to get its response message ) ,( R  for making 
Reader 
Query .1
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database server
iID
Tag 
iID
iID verify .6
IDs  all  Requests  .3
nIDIDID ,..., ,  4. 21
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)||( .2 RIDh i  ,R
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 )~1(  .5
?
RIDh
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
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a brute-force searching comparison between  and ( || )
i
h ID R  to figure out which collected 
identity 
i
ID  is matched. Therefore, any collected identity can be traced. 
 
 
Fig. 12. The attack on Weis’s randomized access control scheme 
3.2 Indexed key-search approach 
The major sticking point with the non-indexed key-search approach is that the reader’s 
computational loading is O(n). Under the practical consideration, it is not scalable since the 
process of key search can be prohibitively costly if the set of tags is large. For reducing the 
cost of key search, the tag’s first reply message must be the index for key-searching. As the 
reader has sent the right response being the “key”, then the tag reveals its identity. 
Unfortunately, the invariable index value will cause the tag traceable. (Chien, 2006; Huang, 
2009; Weis et al., 2003) 
3.2.1 Weis's hash-based access control scheme  
Weis et al. (2003) proposed the hash-lock scheme (Weis et al., 2003), shown in Fig.13. Each 
tag has a hash value 
i
metaID  of its 
i
Key  as it is issued by the back-end database server. The 
 
 
Fig. 13. Weis’s hash-based access control scheme 
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reader can only get this hash value 
i
metaID  as it tries to access the tag. If the reader is legal, 
it can ask the back-end database server to retrieve the corresponding 
i
Key . After the tag 
receives the correct 
i
Key  from the reader, the tag’s information can be accessed by the 
reader. Unfortunately, the scheme not offers location privacy since the tag can be uniquely 
identified by its hash value. Another drawback is that the plain key is sent over the forward 
channel which can be eavesdropped in the RF-signal range. 
In this scheme,the tag can be traced as shown in the following use-case diagram (Fig. 14). 
The adversary can eavesdrop on the legal reader’s broadcasts 
i
Key  for collecting to its own 
database. As the target tag’s key is collected, the adversary realizes the tag had appeared on 
the location. Moreover, the adversary may interrogate a tag to get its response message 
i
metaID  for making a comparison between 
i
metaID and ( )
i
h Key  to figure out which 
collected 
i
Key  is matched. Since a tag’s response message is an invariable 
i
metaID , it can be 
treated as an identifier, for the adversary to trace individuals. This scheme supports data 
privacy but can not protect location privacy of the tag since the invariable hash value is used 
in each time. 
 
 
Fig. 14. The attack on Weis’s hash-based access control scheme 
3.2.2 Chien’s hash-based access control scheme 
Chien (2006) proposed another hash-based access control scheme (Chien, 2006), shown in 
Fig. 15. The back-end database server’s master secret key is 
svr
K , and each tag’s unique key 
is ( || )
i svr i
Key h K ID  Each tag has a hash value 
i
metaID  of its 
i
Key  as it is issued by the 
back-end database server. As the reader tries to access the tag, it can get this hash value 
i
metaID  and the current date . If the reader is legal, it can ask the back-end database server 
to retrieve the corresponding 
i
ID  for generating the right 
i
Key . Then the reader generates a 
hash value ( )
i
h Key date  by the tag’s 
i
Key  and the received current date . After the tag 
Attacker 
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receives the correct hash value ( )
i
h Key date  from the reader, the tag’s information can be 
accessed by the reader. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Chien’s hash-based access control scheme 
 
 
Fig. 16. The attack on Chien’s hash-based access control scheme 
Fig. 16 shows the use-case diagram of this scheme’s weaknesses. The adversary can 
eavesdrop on the legal reader’s broadcasts 
i
Resp  for collecting to its own database. As the 
Reader 
)(esp .6
?
dateKeyhR ii 
Query .1
datemetaID i  , .2  imetaID  .3
)||(   
 find .4
isvri
i
IDKhKey
ID

ii IDKey ,  
iResp
iID
Tag 
imetaID 
Back-end  
database server
svrKey
ii IDmetaID ,
)(esp .5 dateKeyhR ii 
Attacker 
Collect iResp
Store iResp to the  
database 
Store imetaID  to 
the database 
Find the existed 
imetaID of the  
target tag 
Query tag Collect imetaID , date
<< include >><< extend >>
<< extend >>
<<include>>
Find the existed 
iResp of the  
target tag 
www.intechopen.com
  
Current Trends and Challenges in RFID 
 
404 
target tag’s response is collected on the same day, the adversary realizes the tag had 
appeared on the location. Moreover, the adversary may interrogate a tag to get its response 
message (
i
metaID , date ). Since a tag’s response message has an invariable 
i
metaID , it can be 
treated as an identifier for the adversary to trace individuals. 
3.3 Synchronization approach 
The general idea is to change the tag’s identifier after each access session. By refreshing both 
of the tag’s identifier and the corresponding back-end database record in each session, the 
identifier cannot be employed for tracking purposes. The adversary can only eavesdrop or 
intercept a single, unreliable message exchange, it seems to provide the tag with location 
privacy. The literature explores several variants of this principle. Ohkubo, Suzuki, and 
Kinoshita (OSK) propose the conceptually simplest approach. Henrici and Müller propose 
to resolve the synchronization problem. Dimitriou proposes a scheme that eliminates the 
issue of desynchronization entirely. (Avoine & Oechslin, 2005; Dimitriou, 2005; Henrici & 
Muller, 2004; Joaquin et al., 2011; Juels, 2004; Lee et al., 2005, 2006; Ohkubo et al., 2003; 
Osaka et al., 2006) 
3.3.1 Henrici & Muller’s hash-based ID variation scheme 
Henrici & Muller (2004) proposed a hash-based ID variation scheme (Henrici & Muller, 
2004), shown in Fig. 17. A tag with initial 
i
ID , transaction number 
i
TID  and last successful  
 
 
Fig. 17. Henrici & Muller’s hash-based ID variation scheme 
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transaction number 
i
LST  are issued by the back-end database server. As the tag is queried, 
the tag’s transaction number 
i
TID  is increased progressively and the message 
( ( )
i
h ID  ,  ( )
i i
h TID ID   , iii - LSTTIDTID  ) is responded to the reader. If the reader is 
legal, it can ask the back-end database server to use ( )
i
h ID   identifying the tag. Then the 
back-end database server’s response is the hash value ( )
i i
h R TID ID     generated by 
the transaction number 
i
TID , tag’s identity 
i
ID , and a random number R . After the tag 
receives the correct hash value   from the reader, the tag’s information can be accessed by 
the reader. 
In this scheme, the tag updates its 
i
ID  after each successful access. It seems to make the tag’s 
response message ( )
i
h ID   not predictable to prevent the tracing of individual. However, 
the design of identity variation not really guarantees the location privacy. Fig. 18 shows the 
use-case diagram of this scheme’s weaknesses. The adversary may interrogate a tag to get its 
response message ( )
i
h ID   and iii - LSTTIDTID   for collecting to its own database. If 
2 iTID , it means the last transaction is not successful and the tag’s identity iID  is not 
updated. As the target tag’s hash value ( )
i
h ID   once again collected, the adversary 
immediately realizes the target tag appeared. 
 
 
Fig. 18. The attack on Henrici & Muller’s hash-based ID variation scheme 
3.3.2 LCAP scheme 
Lee et al. (2005) proposed a low-cost RFID authentication protocol (LCAP) (Lee et al., 2005), 
shown in Fig.19. A tag with initial iID  is issued by the back-end database server. The back-
end database server always maintains a previous-session record and a current-session 
record for a tag. Each record has the fields (HaIDi, IDi, TDi). HaIDi value is the hash value of 
IDi used for identifying or addressing the tag. TDi is used to link the previous-session record 
and the current-session record each other in order to synchronize the tag and the database in 
case of incompletion of the current session. As the reader tries to query the tag with a 
random number R , the tag emits a hash value ( )ih ID  and the left-half hash value 
( ( || ))
L L i
f h ID R  . If the reader is legal, it can ask the back-end database server to use 
( )
i
h ID   identifying the tag. Then the back-end database server’s response is the right-half 
hash value ( ( || ))R R if h ID R  . After the tag receives the correct right-half hash value R  
from the reader,the tag’s information can be accessed by the reader. 
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Fig. 19. LCAP scheme 
In this scheme, the tag’s identity 
i
ID  is refreshed simultaneously by the tag and the back-
end database server after each successful access. It seems to make the tag’s response 
message ( )
i
h ID   not predictable to prevent the tracing of individual. However, the 
design of “dynamic” identity not really guarantees the location privacy. Fig. 20 shows the 
use-case diagram of this scheme’s weaknesses. Gildas Avoine and Philippe Oechslim had 
described an attack based on refreshment avoidance (Lee et al., 2005). In the attack, an 
adversary always makes a tag unable to refresh its identity and hence can trace the tag. For 
example, the adversary interrogates all tags with the same number R to get the response 
message ( )
i
h ID   and the left-half hash value ( ( || ))
L L i
f h ID R   for collecting to its own 
database. As the target tag’s hash value ( )
i
h ID   once again collected, the adversary 
immediately realizes the target tag appeared. 
 
 
Fig. 20. The attack on LCAP 
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3.4 Tree-based approach 
In the tree-based approach, each tag is not just assigned with a single key but associated 
with a unique leaf node. In fact, a sequence of keys from the root to the leaf node are defined 
for the associated tag. The tag’s authentication response is performed by the sequence of 
keys such that it can be identified by the reader using a breadth-first search in the key tree. 
Based on the logarithmic complexity of tree-based key search, the tree-based identification is 
efficient to support a large scale system. (Bringer et al., 2008; Dimitriou, 2006; Lu et al., 2007; 
Molnar & Wagner , 2004; Molnar et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007; Yeh et al., 2008) 
3.4.1 Dimitriou’s tree-based tag identification scheme 
Dimitriou (2006) proposed a tree-based tag identification scheme (Dimitriou, 2006). Each 
edge is defined with a secret value iKey . iKey  in the path from the root to the leaf node are 
hereby distributed to this tag. If the tree depth is d , each tag contains d  keys. Fig. 21 shows 
a binary key tree with eight tags. For example, 4T  has keys 
1
4k , 24k  and 
3
4k . 
 
 
Fig. 21. A binary key tree with eight tags 
 
 
Fig. 22. Dimitriou’s tree-based tag identification scheme 
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The procedure of Dimitriou’s tree-based tag identification scheme is shown in Fig. 22. As the 
reader tries to query the tag with a random number RN , the tag generates a random number 
TN  and computes the message (
1f , 2f , …, df ) by all its keys. The back-end database server 
has to find out the keys in the trees from the root to the leaf node for identifying the tag. If the 
path exists, the back-end database server regards the tag as a valid tag. 
In this scheme, tag searching using the idea of the tree walking algorithm is efficient for the 
reader. However, it may not be afforded for low-cost tags without enough computing 
capability to generate the responses by the sequence of keys in a transaction. 
3.4.2 Wang et al.’s tree-based authentication scheme 
Wang et al.’s (2007) proposed a Storage-Aware Private Authentication protocol (SAPA) 
(Wang et al, 2007). This scheme uses a sparse tree structure to organize keys of all tags. In 
the tree, only the root and the leaf node store a key. Each tag 
i
T  is arranged to a leaf node 
and has a key triple (
h
k ,
m
k ,
r
k ). hk , is the key assigned to the root. rk is the key assigned to 
the leaf node. 
m
k represents the path from the root to the leaf node which is expressed in 0 
and 1. For example fig.23 shows a sparse binary tree of three levels, the key triple ( hk , 
2
mk  
and 2rk ) is assigned to 2T . 
 
 
 
Fig. 23. A sparse binary tree of three levels 
 
The procedure of Wang et al.’s tree-based authentication scheme is shown in Fig. 24. As the 
reader tries to query the tag with a random number 
1
r , the tag generates a random number 
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r  and computes a sequence of hash chains (
0
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Fig. 24. Wang et al.’s tree-based authentication scheme 
In this scheme, both the tag and the back-end database server update key triple 
( hk , 'mk , 'rk ) for each successful authentication. It may cause a collision for the new path 
'mk  assigned to the tag. The asynchronous attack may happen as the adversary blocks   
sent back to the tag. These drawbacks cause the scheme impractical. 
3.5 Chen et al.’s indefinite-indexed approach 
Chen et al. (2011) proposed the indefinite-indexed access control scheme (Chen et al., 2011), 
shown in Fig.25. As a tag is issued by the back-end database server, the iindex , iKey  and a 
square matrix   are stored in the tag. The tag’s serial number iindex  is specified as a pair of 
values ) ,( ii yx  which can also be regarded as a coordinate. For the purpose of keeping the 
tag’s location private, the serial number cannot be emitted directly. Infinite possibilities exist 
to select two un-parallel lines crossed on the coordinate. If the tag is allowed to freely 
determine the two un-parallel lines, it means iindex  can be represented randomly. The first 
line can be determined by the tag’s serial number ) ,( ii yx  and any point ) ,( 11 yx . Then the 
second point ) ,( 22 yx  can be randomly selected on this line. Later, the other two points 
) ,( 33 yx  and ) ,( 44 yx  can also be determined similarly. The values of these four coordinates 
will be re-arranged into a matrix   and performs the matrix product    as the response 
for the reader. Therefore, only the back-end database server holds the inverse matrix of   
can obtain the matrix   and figure out the tag’s serial number. 
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Fig. 25. Chen’s indefinite-indexed access control scheme 
The motivation of this scheme is to make the tag’s response message not predictable to 
prevent the tracing of individual. In other word, the tag’s response message in each access 
cannot be recognized it is emitted by the same tag. In this scheme, the tag’s serial number is 
regarded as a coordinate. Infinite possibilities exist to select two un-parallel lines crossed on 
the coordinate. Therefore, the tag’s serial number can be represented differently in each 
access and not useful to identify the tag. Moreover, the other messages emitted between the 
tag and the reader are also randomized and not useful to trace the tag. Therefore, the tag’s 
location privacy can be guaranteed. In addition, this scheme also guarantees mutual 
authentication and resists the man-in-the-middle attack, the spoofed reader attack, and the 
spoofed tag attack. 
4. Conclusions 
Modern RFID systems are creating a new era of ubiquitous information society. It allows 
almost everything to be uniquely numbered by embedding a RFID tag. Then the process 
automation efficiency and usability could be improved (Chang, 2005; Garfinkel et al., 2005). 
It allows objects to be scanned and identified without the need for visual or physical contact. 
However, due to the powerful tracking capability of RFID tag, it poses a potentially 
widespread threat to consumer privacy (McCullagh, 2003). In the world of RFID tags 
widespread deployment, anyone with an RFID reader can potentially discover individuals’ 
informational preferences without their permission. 
Without access control, anyone can read the information stored on current generation RFID 
tags. The static unique identifiers stored on tags can be traced for linking the tagged items to 
the individuals who carry the item. Therefore, security and privacy in RFID systems are an 
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important aspect that needs particular attention. Current researches in RFID technology not 
just concentrate on the identification scheme. Secure and efficient authentication and access 
control mechanisms have received much attention in the proposed researches. This article 
examines the main privacy concerns: information leakage of a tag, traceability of the person 
and impersonation of a tag. The impersonation problem is always the first one to be 
analyzed and solved in each scheme. Otherwise, the adversary can collect the information 
sent by the tag and the adversary can try a spoofing or replay attack to impersonate a target 
tag. For further consideration, the disclosure of information arising during a transmission of 
data possibly reveals various personal details without awareness of the holder. Most of the 
proposed schemes were well designed to prevent the problem of tag’s information leakage. 
However, most of the proposed schemes can not really avoid the problem of traceability. 
The adversary may try to distinguish whether the response is transmitted by the target tag 
or not. Once a link is established between the response and the target tag, the adversary can 
monitor the person’s location. For those schemes analyzed in this article, state diagram and 
use-case diagram are used to figure out the schemes’ weaknesses. Through this way, the 
security requirements in RFID applications can be clearly understood to know which 
mechanism actually brings which feature. We expect it is more beneficial those researchers 
as just devoting to the RFID security studies. 
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